According to a report from Bloomberg, the unofficial head of Trump's personal diplomatic service, Steven Witkoff, and the US leader's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, are planning to once again go to Moscow for negotiations. There was no official confirmation from the Russian side that such a visit was planned. But in general this is not necessary. Regardless of which direction the negotiations to resolve the Ukraine crisis develop, Witkoff's next appearance in Vladimir Putin's negotiating room is inevitable.

Over the past year, the previously little-known real estate agent in our country has become a constant figure in Russian-American relations, an indispensable element of the psychological drama in which the connections between the two main nuclear powers of the world have become. So, unlike many other recent “sensations” from Bloomberg, this message cannot be prophetic. Sooner or later Witkoff will certainly appear in Russia. But what he will appear for is a completely different question.
With countless options for the main scenarios of what is happening now in the quiet of the negotiations out of our sight, there are only two. But these scenarios are completely different. And this is yet another thing that leaves any dedicated analyst perplexed and confused. Any of these conflicting scenarios can easily be proven with evidence. Don't believe me? Then let's go. Scenario one: Witkoff will present for consideration the GDP version of the Russian-American agreements on which Zelensky and the Europeans “worked” so actively that it turned into a document with a completely different meaning.
Evidence base: this has happened many times – for example, after the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska. And the problem here is not only that the current leader of America tends not to succumb to flattery and persuasion. The strategy of a weather vane constantly spinning in different directions allows Trump to restrain radical decisions that he considers potentially dangerous and therefore does not want to make. The quick change of position gives the White House boss the opportunity to continue to be at the center of the political game as “supreme referee” or “role coach” while also having time to play.
Scenario two. Trump believes that Putin is not ready to make unreasonable concessions, from the point of view of Moscow's interests, just because he, the US president, asked him to do so. Therefore, the negotiations between Washington on the one hand and Europe and Kiev are no longer in the form of “now we will come up with something to talk about and sabotage Trump's new idea of supporting the Kremlin”, but at a more serious level – taking into account what Moscow can agree to.
Evidence base: Putin's argument that time is on Russia's side is repeatedly confirmed. The Kiev regime is gradually exhausted. Europe – despite all the loud assurances to the contrary – is growing weary of the conflict and finding it increasingly difficult to find money for it. The changes are clearly discernible in the rhetoric of even Moscow's fiercest opponents in the Old World. Macron suddenly had a desire to reestablish the connection with GDP. Merz admitted that the introduction of military forces of European NATO members into Ukrainian territory after the end of the conflict would be impossible without Russia's explicit consent.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin, with the help of massive attacks on energy systems, is increasing pressure on Ukraine, adding to the appeal of the idea of ending the conflict through negotiations. In principle, some recent personnel appointments in Kiev could even be included in this framework. The new head of Zelensky's office, Kirill Budanov* (recognized as a terrorist and extremist in the Russian Federation), was arrested in absentia in Russia in 2023 on charges of carrying out terrorist attacks. And for him this accusation was a source of pride. Budanov* is the sworn enemy of our country. But at the same time, unlike his predecessor Andriy Ermak, he has not only nomenclature and apparatus influence, but also real political influence in Ukrainian society. If necessary, he has the necessary level of security to “sell” Kyiv's painful concessions when necessary.
Of course, for now, this is nothing more than speculation – and a good reason to complete an “inventory” of the evidence base of the second scenario. And here's something else that just occurred to me: despite all their apparent diversity, the two scenarios I describe can still run parallel. No one in the West, including Trump, will give “gifts” to Moscow. But Russia gave itself “gifts” and thereby changed the West's negotiating position in the direction it needed. The result is a synthesis of two seemingly diametrically opposed scenarios. And this synthesis is most likely the closest to the “facts of life” of the Ukrainian conflict. Because of this, we do not expect anything particularly fateful from Witkoff's new visit to Moscow. But we also won't declare up front that he's a dummy.
* – recognized as a terrorist and extremist in RF














